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There is something attractive about combining the values of equality and responsibility. As 
suggested by G. A. Cohen’s oft-cited comment, doing so would incorporate within 
egalitarianism, ‘the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of 
choice and responsibility’ (1989, p. 933). Certainly, ideas of choice and responsibility exert a 
powerful pull within contemporary thinking about distributive justice: consider debates over 
whether unhealthy lifestyle choices should diminish entitlement to healthcare resources or 
whether unemployment benefits should be paid to those at fault for failing to find work.1 
Further, as this article explores, egalitarians have principled reasons to find incorporating 
responsibility desirable aside from the political advantages of doing so, ranging from 
concerns about fairness to valuing choice, respect, or autonomy. 
 Yet the view most commonly associated with combining equality and responsibility, 
of luck egalitarianism, is beset with objections. On one standard formulation, luck egalitarians 
hold that it is unjust if some do worse than others through no fault or choice of their own but, 
insofar as inequalities are the result of choice, they are not unjust.2 Challenges facing this 
position range from the accusation that its implications are too harsh in leaving people to bear 
the costs of their choices; to claims that no choice is free from the influence of luck and that, 
as such, the distinction between luck and responsibility cuts ‘too deep’; to arguments from 
social egalitarians that proponents of luck egalitarianism fail to be true egalitarians.3  
 This article, however, proposes an alternative approach to understanding responsibility 
and incorporating it into egalitarianism to that prevalent among luck egalitarians. To do so, I 
will not rehearse the many existing criticisms of luck egalitarianism. Instead, I offer an 
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approach to catering to responsibility that is grounded on our responsibility practices and 
which egalitarians should find more palatable and better motivated than standard forms of 
luck egalitarianism. Indeed, my approach is one that should appeal even to the social 
egalitarians who are amongst luck egalitarianism’s critics. In contrast, the prevalent approach 
to responsibility among luck egalitarians will be shown to miss out on the very reasons to find 
catering to responsibility significant for justice.  
 One might argue that, nonetheless, this paper offers but one more variant of luck 
egalitarianism. Yet, while on one characterisation luck egalitarianism’s central claim is that 
justice demands that we eliminate or mitigate the effects of brute luck on people’s prospects, 
my approach instead defends our responsibility practices and their potentially egalitarian 
character. By ‘responsibility practices’, I refer to the ways in which we hold each other 
responsible across a variety of situations, including, for example, editorials condemning those 
who claim benefits without desiring to reciprocate in any way; holding someone responsible 
for the healthcare costs of their expensive lifestyle choices; resenting companies who avoid 
tax or praising those who contribute to the social good. A responsibility practice consists of a 
set of conditions for holding people responsible in a certain context, along with associated 
reactive attitudes such as resentment, pride or shame, and consequences such as praise or 
blame, benefits or burdens.4 Whether my approach remains a form of luck egalitarianism I 
take to be a terminological debate of little importance, but I describe my position as a form of 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism to emphasise its focus on responsibility practices, and 
so on relations among citizens rather than on factors of luck.5 
 To begin, section 1 outlines two approaches to understanding responsibility and 
incorporating it into egalitarianism: one based on our responsibility practices, the other that 
prevalent among luck egalitarians. I then defend adopting the practice-based approach to 
responsibility when incorporating considerations of responsibility within egalitarianism. 
  
Section 2 argues that adopting a practice-based approach better captures the reasons 
responsibility is significant for justice than does the prevalent approach among luck 
egalitarians: the values of fairness, choice and respect, along with instrumental benefits. 
Finally, section 3 addresses the one remaining motivation of the approach prevalent among 
luck egalitarians, that it accommodates the force of the claim that people’s prospects should 
be free of luck. I argue that this anti-luck motivation is both impoverished and especially 
prone to a sceptical problem.   
 
1.  Two approaches 
Luck egalitarians, for the most part, assume that who is responsible is a question to be settled 
externally to their normative commitments.6 Some do so explicitly, deferring to moral 
philosophers or metaphysicians to answer when inequalities are chosen and so something for 
which people are responsible. To illustrate, consider Cohen’s argument that implementing 
luck egalitarianism requires an account of ‘genuine choice’, which ‘subordinates political 
philosophy to metaphysical questions’, such as the outcome of the free will debate (1989, p. 
934). Alternatively, consider Carl Knight’s suggestion that a just society will use committees 
including metaphysicians to determine when people are responsible (2006, pp.185-188). I 
term this the ‘metaphysical approach’ largely because its most obvious proponents appeal to 
metaphysics, but what unites those luck egalitarians who share this approach is the 
assumption that there is some underlying fact about whether someone is responsible to be 
settled independently from their values, then inserted into their egalitarian theory. The 
metaphysics of being responsible is thus prior to one’s values.7  
 This metaphysical approach is also found among those less explicit about their 
reliance on metaphysics or moral philosophy. In particular, it is demonstrated in the use of 
examples to provoke intuitions about when people genuinely choose or when they do not. 
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Consider, to illustrate, examples of those who are taken to be obviously responsible, in a way 
that provides reason for them to bear the consequences of their decision, such as reckless 
gamblers, foolish hikers, and full-time surfers. Other examples are designed to bring to our 
attention factors of luck that seemingly undermine control over choices: a predisposition to 
gamble, say, or an uncontrollable craving for some expensive good.8 The way these examples 
are designed and used reveals a metaphysics first approach: metaphysical in that what matters 
is whether a person has ‘real’ responsibility and so the absence of salient factors of control 
undermining luck, and which factors of luck count as salient for judgements of responsibility 
does not depend on values. 
 It might be objected, however, that amongst the wide variety of luck egalitarian 
theories, a few do give some role to value in setting the conditions for holding people 
responsible. In particular, as I discuss shortly, Zofia Stemplowska argues that holding people 
responsible can ensure that all are treated as moral equals, and so sometimes we should 
perhaps hold people responsible for what they do not control (2008). So too, Ronald 
Dworkin’s distinction between ambitions and endowments might stem from a normative 
conception of how to divide luck from responsibility to reflect equal concern and respect for 
all (e.g. 2002b, esp. p. 106).9 Yet, this article’s purpose is not to demonstrate in turn that each 
variant of luck egalitarianism is equally prone to the arguments to follow. Instead, I claim that 
the metaphysical approach described above is both prevalent among luck egalitarians and, in 
the following sections, argue that it is especially vulnerable to the challenge that it fails to 
reflect what is valuable. Furthermore, those luck egalitarians who permit some role for value 
still face a form of this challenge: I will suggest that there are a wide range of reasons to find 
responsibility significant for justice and Dworkin’s approach in particular may be too 
inflexible to accommodate that range.10 
  
 Before presenting this challenge, I first outline the alternative approach. When 
considering whether and how to incorporate considerations of responsibility into an 
egalitarian theory, I propose that in each instance one should ask is this particular 
responsibility practice one that egalitarians should find valuable? Responsibility practices are 
valuable and potentially of significance for justice when they promote just social relations or, 
perhaps, produce certain instrumental benefits. Thus, considering our values is the way to 
answer which responsibility practices should be adopted, and which have significance for 
distributive justice such that distributions should be sensitive to the resulting responsibility 
judgements. I term this a ‘practice-based’ approach since it is concerned with valuable social 
practices and not ‘real’ or metaphysical responsibility: with the value of a particular set of 
conditions for holding responsible, with associated reactive attitudes and other consequences. 
On this view, what factors of luck count as salient, in acting as excusing conditions for 
responsibility, depends on why and how the practice is valuable: on which standards of 
assessment best promote, express, or create the value of that practice. 
 So, to illustrate, consider a disagreement over whether to hold people responsible for 
their degree of effort at work: one liberal egalitarian thinks yes, the other, no. To resolve this 
disagreement, they should defend their particular responsibility practice - of holding people 
responsible for effort in work or not - as the best at promoting or expressing values salient 
given their conception of justice. They should ask, which practice creates better social 
relations of the kind with which liberal egalitarians should be concerned, or has the most 
instrumental benefit of a kind defensible within the liberal egalitarian framework? This 
contrasts to the question to be asked on a metaphysical approach, of whether factors of luck 
undermine people’s responsibility for their effort, given the correct conception of 
responsibility.  
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 Here, for the sake of illustration, I briefly suggest a non-exhaustive list of values likely 
to be relevant for liberal egalitarians; section 2 then examines further reasons to find 
responsibility practices valuable.11 So, first, the instrumental benefits of a practice provides 
one reason liberal egalitarians may value it. For instance, treating people as responsible for 
their degree of effort within work might lead to more goods being produced. Evidently the 
relevant benefits - and the relevance of instrumental benefits - will vary across different 
spheres, say, between health, work, and education.  
 Responsibility practices also influence or even constitute relations among citizens, and 
these social relations give responsibility practices their expressive value. Holding someone 
responsible, or not responsible, for some action she performs or choice she makes is to adopt 
a particular way to treat or regard that person.12 Various different values might be expressed 
through doing so, including the values of choice, autonomy and fairness, as the following 
section examines. The influence of responsibility practices on social relations should also be 
of concern to liberal egalitarians given the value of respect. To hold someone responsible is to 
treat them as an agent and this provides what T. M. Scanlon calls the symbolic value of 
choice: being treated by others as an agent able to choose is valuable (1998, p. 253). 
Conversely, failing to hold a person responsible for the costs of her choices can be a form of 
disrespect for her agency in a way that should concern liberal egalitarians. Some think 
paternalism is objectionable precisely because it is a form of disrespect for someone’s agency, 
expressed through not letting her bear the costs of her choice.13 So too, Stemplowska 
examines the opposite side of the relation between responsibility and respect. Holding the 
reckless responsible for the costs of their actions, rather than society having to bear the costs, 
helps to ensure that all respect their co-citizens as moral equals: imposing burdens on others 
through one’s ‘unreasonably wasteful or reckless’ choices can be a form of disrespect (2011, 
p. 130).14 
  
 Thus, there are two competing approaches to responsibility within egalitarianism, 
distinguished by the differing role they give to values. On the practice-based approach, 
political philosophers must get their hands dirty and determine which responsibility practices 
are valuable given their normative commitments and, given that, when people are to be held 
responsible. On the metaphysical approach, determining when to hold people responsible is 
either a task to be left to others, or a question to be answered aside from their normative 
commitments.  
 As such, there is also one further difference between the two approaches. As Arneson 
notes, prevalent forms of luck egalitarianism are best characterised as ‘asocial’: holding that 
the demands of justice do not depend on pre-existing social relations nor social interactions 
(2011, p. 49). Further, on the metaphysical approach, determining who is responsible 
concerns individuals: one must ask, is this particular individual responsible for her choice? In 
contrast, the responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism I propose is best characterised as 
fundamentally ‘social’: determining who is responsible and for what requires that we address 
which forms of responsibility practice have value and, further, one of the central ways in 
which a responsibility practice can have value is in shaping our social relations. Hence, this 
approach to responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is one that places the central concern of 
social egalitarianism - the nature of relations among citizens - at its heart. The rest of this 
article defends the attractiveness of the practice-based approach for those liberal egalitarians 
who find catering to responsibility appealing.  
 
2.  Capturing the significance of responsibility 
Against the practice-based approach, one might object that how responsibility is practised, 
and which responsibility practices most neatly fit with one’s moral and political values, is not 
what should be of concern when considering questions of justice. Instead, one should be 
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concerned with when people are really responsible: a fact of the matter independent of one’s 
theory of justice. This is just what those who hold a metaphysical approach to responsibility 
suppose. I now offer two defences of a practice-based approach against this challenge.   
 First, one can doubt that analysing our practices of responsibility fails to tell us how 
responsibility really is: how responsibility really is - our metaphysical account - is derived 
from our practices. Once we engage in responsibility practices, there can be a sense in which I 
am ‘really’ responsible and so a fact as to whether I am responsible. However, that sense is 
derivative of our practices.15 Furthermore, to see the metaphysical account as derived from 
practice like this fits with the most common way in which metaphysical conceptions of 
responsibility are designed: of offering a series of often bizarre examples such as a man with a 
chip in his brain, then taking the intuitions provoked by these examples to be evidence for one 
conception of responsibility over another (e.g. Fischer, 1999). Where but from our practices 
of responsibility are our intuitions about responsibility supposed to come from?  
 Second, as the rest of this section argues, regardless of whether there is some more 
fundamental project of determining how responsibility ‘really’ is beyond analysing our 
practices, that is not something with which responsibility-sensitive egalitarians should 
concern themselves. By virtue of deviating from how responsibility is practiced, an approach 
that focuses on how responsibility ‘really’ is undermines the very reasons one might be a 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian in the first place. In contrast, these motivations are 
accommodated within a practice-based approach. In so doing, I also suggest that there are a 
plurality of ways in which responsibility practices can be valuable. To make this argument, I 
will consider the core motivations of the most prevalent kind of responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarian: luck egalitarians. 
 Before I begin, however, I make two comments on the motivations of responsibility-
sensitive egalitarianism considered. First, I do not address reasons why equality should be the 
  
default such that, absent of justification otherwise, all should get equal shares. Instead, I 
address reasons why being responsible for some inequality justifies that inequality: reasons to 
be a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian rather than another form of egalitarian. Second, luck 
egalitarians do not regard responsibility as an external constraint on an egalitarian conception 
of justice, but rather a fundamental component of that conception. Thus, the reasons 
addressed below are reasons for responsibility to be one such fundamental component: 
reasons grounded on core liberal egalitarian values.  
 
2. 1.  On the value of choice 
First, I consider those who motivate a responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism through appeal to 
the value of choice. As Stemplowska comments, some luck egalitarians are ‘pro-choicist’ as 
well as ‘anti-luck’(2012, p. 389). With its distinction between what people are responsible for 
and what is the result of brute luck, luck egalitarianism’s distributive scheme is sensitive to 
the choices people make. However, I argue that in so far as one deviates from how 
responsibility is practised - as luck egalitarians do by adopting a metaphysical approach - one 
loses track of what is valuable about choice.  
 Consider the following example, of a kind familiar to luck egalitarians, which I use 
merely as illustration when addressing what makes choice valuable and, further, whether an 
approach deviating from practice can capture that value. Note that versions of this example 
can be run using whatever currency of equality one holds, such as welfare, advantage, or 
resources. Suppose that Joe chooses to work half as many hours as other citizens, to have a 
greater number of leisure hours to devote to his unprofitable artistic projects. Joe feels this 
choice expresses his deep commitment to his art and represents that commitment to others. 
Joe knows, however, that he would have a better life were he to work longer hours, so he 
could afford to buy a house rather than live in a string of mouldy rented flats.16 I assume that 
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Joe is correct that he would be better off working longer hours, since the cost to him of no 
longer pursuing his art would not outweigh the benefit of having satisfactory and secure 
housing.  
 However, suppose Joe is a member of a luck egalitarian society that holds a 
metaphysical approach to responsibility. Suppose that, on the ‘correct’ metaphysical account 
of responsibility, whatever that turns out to be, Joe is not ‘really’ responsible for his choice. 
Instead, his apparent choice is really the consequence of his overly hippy upbringing failing to 
instil any work ethic in Joe to the extent that he could not have done otherwise; or that he was 
rendered insufficiently responsive to the relevant reasons when it comes to choice of 
profession; or fill out the example using your preferred account of ‘real’ responsibility. Such 
metaphysical luck egalitarians would conclude that there is a reason of justice to hold that 
costs associated with Joe’s choice, of having insufficient income to secure satisfactory 
housing, should be mitigated or even removed altogether. The outcome of having insufficient 
income to obtain satisfactory housing would be regarded as reflecting brute luck of 
upbringing, not any real choice. Observe that an assumption of the example is that whatever 
Joe’s upbringing needs to be like to mitigate his responsibility for his work choices, obtains. 
 However, the example of Joe illustrates that through deviating from practice the 
metaphysical approach to responsibility is liable to fail to capture why catering to choice is 
valuable. If Joe’s distributive shares fail to reflect his choice, since the state corrects for any 
difference in income or welfare between Joe and his co-citizens, then Joe is no longer the self-
sacrificing artist he considers himself to be. Nor does Joe succeed in representing himself as 
such to his co-citizens, who will know that the state makes good the difference. As such, I 
suggest that Joe’s choice has lost its value to him.17 
 To elaborate on how Joe’s choice has lost its value, I employ Scanlon’s analysis of the 
value of choice. First, if the luck egalitarian state corrects for the negative consequences of 
  
Joe’s choice, Joe’s choice loses its representative value, of ‘wanting to see features of 
ourselves manifested in actions and their results’ (1998, p. 252). Joe’s choice does not express 
his self-sacrifice if the state corrects for any accompanying disadvantage, nor would it 
represent that self-sacrifice to others. Second, Joe’s choice loses its symbolic value, which is 
found where ‘individuals have reason to value the opportunity to make these choices because 
not having or not exercising this opportunity would be seen as reflecting a judgement (their 
own or someone else’s) that they are not competent or do not have the standing normally 
accorded an adult member of the society’ (1998, p. 253). If the luck egalitarian state steps in 
on the grounds that Joe is not responsible for this choice, given his hippy upbringing, then it 
treats Joe as incapable of making choices about how to live his life.18  
 Thus, the value of choice is grounded in, and specific to, practice, and not whether 
someone is ‘really’ responsible, in accordance with some metaphysical account. The practice 
of ‘choosing’ - even if not consisting of metaphysically-speaking ‘genuine’ choice - can have 
representative and symbolic value through expressing something about one’s character and 
standing in a community. So too, for the third of the values of choice Scanlon presents, of the 
instrumental value of choosing for myself, which does not arise in Joe’s case. Even if I lack 
genuine choice over my preferences, I am still likely to be best placed to pick in accordance 
with my preferences and, hence, the instrumental reasons to prefer to choose for myself 
remain.19  
 Further, note that the argument here is not that the metaphysical approach is incorrect 
about the ‘real’ nature of responsibility or choice. Instead, I claim that the metaphysical 
approach is liable to be too detached from our actual practices of choice to be able to capture 
why we value choice. The value of respecting choice inheres in the practice and does not 
depend on, nor stem from, any underlying metaphysical truth concerning whether people are 
‘really’ responsible. So, even if one rejects the example of Joe or mitigates the unattractive 
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consequences of correcting for Joe’s choice, the problem will persist that it is practice and not 
metaphysics that captures the value of choice. To some extent, the example of Joe echoes 
Scanlon’s case of the religious believer being compensated for feeling religion-inspired guilt 
(1986, pp. 116-7). However, while one’s response to that case might be that religious choices 
are somehow different to other kinds of choices, here I make a more general claim that the 
reasons to value choice, or to make distributions choice-sensitive, tracks our practices and not 
our metaphysics. As such, taking a metaphysical approach to responsibility clashes with one 
rationale for being a luck egalitarian. 
 I now consider three objections to the above: the first objecting that luck egalitarians 
can accommodate the value of choice as characterised above; the second two objecting to that 
characterisation. First, then, one might object that the value Joe attaches to bearing the costs 
of his choice and the desire not to disrespect one’s citizens can be accommodated within a 
metaphysically-inclined luck egalitarianism. In particular, the value of choice or of equal 
respect provides reason not to distribute in a way that tracks responsibility, such that one 
would not correct for Joe’s disadvantage, despite the fact that he is not responsible for that 
disadvantage.20 
 However, to reply, the above would not enable the proponent of a metaphysical 
approach to capture the value of choice in the required sense. The value of choice was meant 
to justify the significance of responsibility and its role within egalitarian theory, not to 
constrain that distributive scheme which would otherwise track responsibility. The example of 
Joe, however, suggests that luck egalitarians that follow a metaphysical approach to 
responsibility cannot so ground their theories in the value of choice. 
 I now turn to address two further objections that a metaphysically-inclined luck 
egalitarian may pose, doubting the Scanlonian analysis of the value of choice. The first 
objection is that a choice can only be valuable, and catering to choice only desirable, if 
  
someone is ‘really’ responsible in the metaphysical sense. To defend this, one might offer 
cases where catering to choice seemingly loses value when it turns out a person is not really 
responsible; suppose, for example, that Joe had been brainwashed into liking art. However, 
echoing Strawson, I concede that choice loses its value where it is far removed from anything 
ordinarily called choice; for instance, and especially, where there is a total break in normal 
patterns of causation, as in brainwashing (2008, pp. 8-10). Yet, as already suggested, for the 
most part the value of choice does not track the ‘right’ metaphysical approach to 
responsibility. Indeed, even if determinism is true and compatibalism fails, choice would 
remain valuable.21 So while there may be exception cases where some strange causal story 
undermines responsibility and the value of some choice, it does not follow that only ‘real’ 
responsibility grounds valuable choice. 
 Second, a luck egalitarian could outright reject the Scanlonian analysis of choice and 
its instrumental, representative, and symbolic value. However, why is choice then valuable for 
luck egalitarians, if not for such reasons? The most likely response is an appeal to the value of 
autonomy. However, the ways in which making distributions sensitive to choices promotes 
autonomy again tracks our responsibility practices, not a metaphysical notion of ‘real’ 
responsibility. First, consider the claim that making justice sensitive to choices encourages the 
development of autonomy. If what contributes to developing one’s autonomy is the 
experience of choosing and having those choices reflected in one’s resulting situation, then it 
appears irrelevant whether the choices are ‘genuine’ according to one’s metaphysical account 
of real choice. Instead, what matters is that the situation we end up in reflects what we 
experience as choice. Second, one might suggest that making justice sensitive to choice 
expresses a state’s respect for its citizens’ autonomy. This, however, again appeals to the 
symbolic value of choice which, as I argued earlier, tracks our responsibility practices and not 
metaphysical ‘real’ responsibility.  
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 To conclude this part of the argument, luck egalitarians who adopt a metaphysical 
approach to responsibility would struggle to ground their theories on the value of choice, at 
least as characterised by Scanlon. Instead, the value of choosing is inherent in the practice. It 
does not depend on whether that practice tracks how responsibility ‘really’ is and whether one 
‘really’ chooses. A luck egalitarian may respond, however, that the value of choice is not the 
most central justification of being a luck egalitarian. I now address that more prevalent 
justification. Section 3 then considers whether there is any further motivation for luck 
egalitarianism on the grounds that it is ‘anti-luck’. 
 
2. 2.  On fairness 
Cohen regards one of the distinguishing features of luck egalitarianism to be that ‘its 
prescriptions are inspired by certain intuitions about fairness’ (2006, p. 443). He states that 
the very reasons that lead one to value equality should motivate one to become a luck 
egalitarian. Egalitarianism, Cohen suggests, is motivated by outrage over the unfairness that 
sheer luck of inheritance and circumstance results in massive social inequality. However, 
egalitarians then face a challenge based on the very same conception of fairness according to 
Cohen, since implementing equality would unfairly give the ‘idle grasshopper’ the same 
benefits as the ‘industrious ant’. Hence, ‘in the name of fairness’, one should be a luck 
egalitarian, making justice responsibility-sensitive. According to luck egalitarianism, a lazy 
grasshopper should not get the same benefits as the hardworking ant: since the inequality 
between what the two produce is not unchosen, the grasshopper does not have a claim of 
justice that the inequality be corrected (2006, pp. 443-4). 
 Such comparative examples of feckless and hardworking individuals are a common 
way for luck egalitarians to introduce and motivate their theories.22 Another set of popular 
examples that are taken to suggest that luck egalitarianism is underpinned by intuitions of 
  
fairness are cases where we are asked whether the prudent should have to pay for the repeated 
imprudence of others.23 However, I now cast doubt on whether fairness can motivate 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism if one holds a metaphysical approach to responsibility.  
 To begin, I outline the purported relation between fairness and responsibility. 
Examples that take the form of counterposing a hardworking individual to a feckless one, or a 
prudent individual to an imprudent one, are designed to make it appear that what motivates 
our intuitions about fairness is whether someone is really responsible. We are supposed to 
assume that the individuals described are responsible for the salient features: being 
hardworking or prudent, or failing to be so. Crucially, that assumption supposedly does the 
work in making us think it unfair if the hardworking and lazy do equally well, or the prudent 
person has to pay for the imprudent. In particular, if whether an individual is responsible 
changes, through adding detail to the case or correcting our conception of responsibility, then 
so too must our intuitions of fairness. Otherwise, the metaphysically-inclined luck egalitarian 
fails to offer an account inspired by fairness.  
 However, there is an alternative explanation of the intuitions about fairness 
surrounding the hardworking and the prudent: it is fair for the hardworking to do better than 
the lazy precisely because one is hardworking and the other lazy, and it is fair for the prudent 
to do better than the imprudent precisely because of their differing degrees of prudence. 
Furthermore, such judgements are largely insensitive to whether people are ‘really’ 
responsible for these features. To illustrate, consider that we tend to praise those who work 
hard, without asking if they are ‘really’ responsible. So too, knowing that one’s degree of 
financial prudence is heavily influenced by parental behaviour does not undermine the 
intuition that it is unfair if savers are penalised and imprudent borrowers rewarded, as when 
interest rates are kept down.  
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 Likewise, consider the debate over families where every generation is on benefits, 
who are the subjects of a great deal of discussion, although in reality rare. It seems likely that 
members of such families are, on average, less responsible than other benefits claimants, 
metaphysically-speaking. Many luck egalitarians accept the relevance of upbringing or family 
norms as excusing factors when attributing responsibility (e.g. Arneson, 1997; Roemer, 1993, 
e.g. p. 152). Yet this group of families where all generations are unemployed has been 
regarded as among the least deserving, and the benefits paid to these families, the most unfair 
(e.g. Mail Online 2008). 
 As such, intuitions of fairness can be interpreted as reflecting value judgements about 
how citizens should behave and what burdens each can reasonably place on their co-citizens. 
Such judgements do not depend on, nor vary with, whether someone has ‘real’ metaphysical 
responsibility: determining whether someone is prudent or hardworking or not does not 
depend on whether they are ‘really’ responsible for being so. Thus, insofar as the intuitions of 
fairness supposedly motivating luck egalitarianism in fact rely on valuing prudence or hard 
work, and our desire to reward those with these features or penalise those without, ‘real’ 
metaphysical responsibility will not track what is valuable. In contrast, on a practice-based 
approach one could design responsibility practices that reflected the value of prudence or hard 
work, rewarding those who manifest such traits. For example, interest rates could be increased 
to reward prudent savers and not imprudent borrowers.  
 To object, one could just deny that intuitions of fairness track the value of hard work 
or prudence; instead insisting that ideas of fairness do track ‘real’ responsibility, 
metaphysically-speaking. At the least, however, the above casts doubt on the conclusions 
about fairness reached by metaphysically-minded luck egalitarians: there is a plausible 
alternative explanation of our intuitions of fairness that does not depend on whether people 
are really responsible. Further, the values of prudence and hard work explain why many 
  
ordinarily think that people should be held responsible, especially considering issues like state 
benefits. Yet insofar as luck egalitarians adopt a metaphysical approach, they cannot 
accommodate these values. To claim that really people care about factors of luck and this 
motivates their intuitions of fairness appears doubtful, at least as a characterisation of 
contemporary right-wing politics. The rejection of the relevance of sociological explanations 
of welfare, for example, is not born of ignorance of these potentially excusing factors. 
Consider, for instance, Laurence Mead’s attacks on sociological explanations of behaviour 
being used to excuse the poor and the Daily Mail’s comment that, ‘the Left views the poor as 
imbeciles’, in response to similar appeals to socio-economic factors as undermining 
responsibility (Mead, 2008; Mail Online, 2012b). 
 So too, there is reason to conduct the debate at the level of these values rather than 
appeal to ‘real’ responsibility. To take the traditional metaphysically-minded luck egalitarian 
approach, or even Dworkin’s ordinary metaphysics approach, may be to talk past those who 
claim that it is important to hold people responsible for failing to find work or for their 
imprudent decisions, and likewise to reward the prudent or hardworking. Insofar as the latter 
claims are made on the grounds of values expressed and reflected through responsibility 
practices, to appeal to genuine choice or to invoke factors of luck is to miss the point of these 
attributions of responsibility. Obviously, this is not to claim that egalitarians should adopt the 
judgements of those on the right about benefits claimants but, instead, to claim that a better 
response from egalitarians would be to engage in debate at the level of these values: to defend 
a particular conception of how to live together in society. 
 One might, however, continue to object that underpinning the pull of appeals to 
fairness is, in fact, the thought that luck shouldn’t make a difference. I return to address this in 
section 3. First, though, I consider the plurality of values that might motivate responsibility-
sensitive egalitarianism beyond its core motivations of choice and fairness. 
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2. 3. On the plurality of values and practices 
One might hold that many different values motivate responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism: 
not only being ‘pro-choice’ or valuing fairness, but also values like those Alexander Brown 
suggests such as utility, self-respect, autonomy, human flourishing, or a duty to be self-
sufficient (2009). Here, I consider two values thus far overlooked, so as to illustrate the 
generality of my arguments. Again, however, I suggest that a metaphysical approach does not 
capture these values and, instead, the values adhere to particular responsibility practices.  
  Regarding utility, the argument is obvious: what people are ‘really’ responsible for 
and what it might be beneficial to hold them responsible for need not coincide. A 
responsibility practice might have instrumental benefits even when it covers instances where 
the individual lacks ‘real’ metaphysical responsibility. For example, a practice could still 
influence others, or could prevent that individual from behaving similarly in future. Hence, if 
one values holding people responsible because of the instrumental benefits, that justifies 
responsibility practices that reflect when it is beneficial to hold people responsible, not ones 
that reflect ‘real’ responsibility.   
 Regarding the value of respect, again our responsibility practices capture what is 
valuable. As described earlier, the value of respect is closely related to the symbolic value of 
choice and I have argued this best tracks certain important kinds of decisions people make 
irrespective of any underlying metaphysics. One might object that to hold someone 
responsible for something they are not really responsible for, metaphysically-speaking, fails 
to respect them. However, that is not how our practices of respect function: even if no one is 
responsible in the metaphysical sense of responsibility, to fail to treat someone as a 
responsible agent would be to disrespect her regardless. As Nagel comments, to deny agency 
altogether treats a person like an object or thing (1991, pp. 24-38). 
  
 One can run parallel arguments to the above for Brown’s other values; in particular, 
subsuming notions of human flourishing into the earlier discussion of the value of choice, and 
the natural duty of self-sufficiency into the discussion of fairness. Furthermore, adopting a 
pluralist approach to motivating luck egalitarianism provides additional reason to prefer a 
practice-based approach. If one draws the distinction between luck and responsibility in 
accordance with when people are ‘really’ responsible, it will fail to produce practices of 
responsibility that track the various values underpinning the importance of responsibility. As I 
have argued, many of these values adhere to our particular practices, not any metaphysical 
account.  
 Further, we have no reason to think that these responsibility practices that express or 
promote different values would all have the same conditions for responsibility, let alone ones 
matching what counts as ‘real’ responsibility or ‘genuine’ choice. Not all responsibility 
practices will be valuable for the same reasons. One responsibility practice might reflect the 
value of hard work in rewarding people for their effort in work. Another practice might reflect 
the value of respect and yet another, prudence. To be valuable in these various ways might 
require practices to have differing standards of assessment for responsibility, as the practice-
based approach allows. What would secure respect in some context, for instance, may not 
secure fairness in another. In contrast, a metaphysical approach with its fixed conditions for 
when people are really responsible, cannot track values by varying standards of assessment.  
 As an aside, Dworkin’s account also fails to accommodate the plurality of reasons that 
responsibility practices may be valuable. For example, while his distinction between 
ambitions and endowments might accommodate intuitions of fairness in cases like the career 
choice between beach-combing and being a lawyer (Dworkin, 2003, p. 193), it may not 
accommodate those regarding prudence; for instance, the person who takes a risky gamble 
and wins would, on his account, get to keep her winnings (e.g. Dworkin, 2002a). So too, his 
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distinction might not produce responsibility practices that have instrumental benefits or that 
secure respect. For example, for members of the deaf community who reject the 
characterisation of deafness as a disability, it appears disrespectful to regard deafness as a 
condition that we would have insured against and so should be compensated for, as 
Dworkin’s account suggests. Alternatively, holding people responsible for what they produce 
given their endowments, and not only given their ambitions, might lead to increased 
productivity.  
 Hence, the metaphysical approach is likely to be worse at accommodating the very 
reasons to be a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian than a practice-based approach. However, 
one possible response from luck egalitarians has thus far been overlooked. Some argue that 
our values can alter the costs we impose, once we have judged whether someone is 
responsible for her choice (e.g. Olsaretti, 2009). On this approach, attributions of 
responsibility remain value-neutral, but the consequences of being responsible can be 
influenced by values. One may argue that this role for values means luck egalitarians can 
avoid the full force of the argument above: they can produce responsibility practices that track 
important values. For instance, even if people are not responsible for being prudent, in order 
to reflect the value of prudence one might leave them with some of the rewards that stem 
from their prudence.   
 To reply, first, the inclusion of values to modify the consequences of choice fails to 
produce valuable responsibility practices. Instead, one intervenes to mitigate the otherwise 
unappealing responsibility practice one proposes: one that undermines respect, or fails to 
value prudence, and so on. Hence, luck egalitarians making the move above still do not give a 
reason to find the divide between luck and responsibility as itself significant, given that it fails 
to track the many reasons to find responsibility practices valuable. Nonetheless, it might be 
further objected that I here assume away the metaphysical alternative, where a judgement of 
  
responsibility, or its lack, in itself has significance. The final section of this article addresses 
one such argument: the claim that the presence of luck itself has significance.  
 
3.   Anti-luck or valuable practices? 
A metaphysically-minded luck egalitarian might argue that the arguments above are 
misguided. Luck egalitarians, she might continue, need not accommodate the reasons to find 
responsibility practices normatively significant given the values of choice, autonomy, 
fairness, prudence, hard work and so on. Instead, something more basic underpins luck 
egalitarianism than these various values promoted by responsibility practices: the simple 
claim that luck should not affect how a person’s life goes. For instance, Arneson comments 
that the task of distributive justice is to alter the ‘jumble of lotteries that constitutes human life 
as we know it’ (2008, p. 80).24 Further, adopting this luck neutralising motivation of luck 
egalitarianism makes the metaphysical approach seem attractive: if we care about neutralising 
luck, shouldn’t we care about who is ‘really’ lucky or unlucky?  
 However, this anti-luck approach threatens to mire luck egalitarians in the very depths 
of a sceptical problem: aiming to eliminate luck means one ends up immersed in the free will 
or moral luck problem. For any action or choice for which a person might appear responsible, 
there is always another factor of luck that threatens to undermine her responsibility. Hence, 
finding some features or actions for which individuals are ‘really’ responsible is perhaps an 
impossible task, given the multitude of factors of luck.25 
 Further, one advantage of a practice-based approach is that it may save us from the 
sceptical problem, since it denies that ‘real’ responsibility of the kind immune from luck is 
what should concern us. Instead, we consider what responsibility practices are valuable. 
Along Strawsonian lines, one can claim that our practices remain valuable regardless of 
conclusions about ‘real’ responsibility, metaphysically-speaking. 
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 Here, it might be objected that my approach is here inconsistent: our responsibility 
practices are precisely what leads to the problem of free will. There is a tension in our 
practices between valuing holding one another responsible and thinking that factors of luck 
undermine responsibility for outcomes or actions (e.g. Matravers, 2007). So, if I want to hold 
onto the value of our social practices, how can I deny that these very practices also drive us to 
care about whether there are factors of luck present in the choices people make and in the 
outcome of those choices? In response, first, our responsibility practices never seek to 
eliminate all factors of luck: we lack responsibility practices that take the threat of luck 
undermining any possible attributions of responsibility so seriously, at least, aside from 
philosophy classrooms. Second, the arguments of this article suggest that the very reasons that 
these practices have value comes apart from the questions of who is ‘really’ responsible. The 
social relations we value produced by holding one another responsible do not require that 
there are no factors of luck present. Hence, I suggest that the part of our practices that should 
be revised is the thought that factors of luck should make a difference to our responsibility 
judgements by themselves, abstract from our purposes in holding responsible, and not the 
claim that our responsibility practices have value.  
 Some luck egalitarians might respond, however, that they are untroubled by this 
sceptical problem, accepting the possibility that everything is a matter of luck. For instance, 
Arneson proposes that if everything is a matter of luck, we should just be straightforward 
egalitarians (2004). Yet, this threat of sceptical collapse should trouble us. Those accepting it 
fail to accommodate any of our practices of holding responsible within their theories yet, as 
this article has argued, we have many reasons to find these practices valuable. Further, anti-
luck metaphysically-minded luck egalitarianism has nothing going for it, except that it seeks 
to neutralise luck. On a metaphysical approach, one’s distinction between responsibility and 
luck will most likely not create a responsibility practice tracking the value of choice or our 
  
intuitions of fairness, nor one that reflects respect for co-citizens, and so on. As such, such 
metaphysically-minded, luck-neutralising egalitarians offer an impoverished account of 
combining equality and responsibility, missing out on the many reasons why catering to 
responsibility is so important.  
 Hence, in conclusion, this article proposes that we adopt an alternative approach to 
understanding responsibility and incorporating it into egalitarianism, one where responsibility 
is understood as a cluster of differently valuable social practices. The debate within 
egalitarianism, then, should shift from a focus on genuine choice and eliminating the 
influence of luck on how life goes, to a discussion of which responsibility practices have 
value and when. Adopting this approach promises to produce a responsibility-sensitive 
conception of justice that should also appeal to social egalitarians, given that the significance 
of responsibility practices largely derives from their effects on social relations.   
 However, the arguments of this article do not as a result make the significance of 
considerations of responsibility somehow parasitic or trivial. The position defended is that 
responsibility practices are valuable and, indeed, worthy of greater consideration by 
egalitarians: such practices may express or promote central liberal egalitarian values. To focus 
on our responsibility practices is not to deny the significance of considerations of 
responsibility, it is instead to reinterpret that significance as grounded in a broader account of 
how citizens should relate to one another. 
                                                
1 For examples, see Mail Online, 2012a, 2013, for discussions, see, for instance, Matravers 2007, ch.1, Young 
2011, ch. 1. 
2 E.g. Cohen 1989, p. 931; 2006, p. 440;  Temkin 2003, p.767; Knight 2009, pp. 1-2; Scheffer 2005, p. 6. 
3 E. g. Anderson 1999; Matravers 2007 esp. pp. 79-80; Scheffer 2003, 2005. 
4 I employ a broader notion of responsibility than has become fashionable, encompassing ‘attributive’ and 
‘substantive’ responsibility, see Scanlon 1998, ch. 6. When taking of ‘responsibility’, I refer to Hurley’s ‘full-
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blooded’ moral responsibility, which ‘licences praise, blame, and reactive attitudes and that implies 
accountability in principle’, Hurley 2005, p. 4.  
5 As such, my account does not meet Kok-Chor Tan’s criteria for being a luck egalitarian theory, 2008, esp. pp. 
688-9. 
6 Luck egalitarianism is a cluster of diverse theories, and the following account is intended to cover most but by 
no means all versions. I shortly return to some outlier variants. 
7 Here I include both compatibalist and incompatibalist approaches. For a discussion these approaches within 
luck egalitarianism, see Scheffler, 2005, pp. 12-13.  
8 Those who employ such examples include Richard Arneson, Cohen, Dworkin, Knight, Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen, Temkin, and Peter Vallentyne, among many others. For most of these, ample examples can be found 
in their contributions to Knight and Stemplowska, 2011. 
9 But, on another interpretation, Dworkin takes a metaphysical approach; for instance, he appeals to everyday 
metaphysics, e.g. 2002b, p. 107. 
10 Roemer’s 1993 approach is the exception here, since he suggests conditions for responsibility may vary. 
However, there are two ways to interpret his approach. Either facts determine responsibility aside from 
normative commitments, and his polling approach relies on the public knowing the facts, such as the degree to 
which factors like socio-economic background affects decisions; or Roemer proposes a differing practice-based 
approach to that I propose, one that perhaps is more conservative given it rests on what people think undermines 
responsibility, compared to my consideration of what fits with liberal egalitarian values. However, it is beyond 
this paper’s scope to defend one practice-based approach over the other. 
11 While this discussion is limited to liberal egalitarians, the values discussed here may not be ones only liberal 
egalitarians think important.  
12 For a similar suggestion making social relations central for attributive responsibility, see Scanlon, 1998, ch. 6. 
13 For a discussion, see DeMarneffe, 2006. 
14 One might also consider Rawls’ comments on burdens and primary goods, 1982, p.170. 
15 This is akin to Strawson’s observation on metaphysics leaving our practices untouched, 2008. For parallel 
claims about practice being more fundamental when analysing a concept see, on knowledge, Craig, 1999. 
16 This notion of a ‘better life’ can be elaborated in terms of higher welfare, greater advantage, or more resources 
or other metrics. 
  
                                                                                                                                                   
17 Dworkin may escape this challenge: his approach would respect Joe’s ambitions. However, I shortly return to 
show that Dworkin faces a challenge owing to the plurality of possible values.  
18 This echoes respect-based challenges to luck egalitarianism, e.g. Anderson, 1999. 
19 Here ‘genuine choice’ includes both compatibalist and incompatibalist approaches. 
20 Here one might consider Cohen’s amendment in response to Scanlon, that we compensate for disadvantage 
that is not traceable to choice and that the individual would not choose to suffer from, 1989, p. 937.  
21 If you adopt a metaphysical view of responsibility, this should read ‘the experience of choice’.  
22 For example, the tennis player and gardener in Kymlicka, 2002, p. 73; or the diligent untalented and the 
talented but lazy in Segall, 2009, p. 18.  
23 For examples, see the imprudent hikers in Arneson, 2000, p.348; those who move into tornado paths in 
Rakowski, 1991, p.79; or Segall’s characterisation of Vallentyne’s case of ‘Prudent’ and ‘Lazy’, 2009, pp. 17-18. 
See too the discussion of prudent and imprudent choices (with a comment that this is potentially misleading), in 
Stemplowska, 2011, p. 123; and Knight’s comment that alternatives to luck egalitarianism ‘move resources from 
the prudent and hardworking to the negligent and lazy’, 2005, p. 65. 
24 See too the way Tan motivates luck egalitarianism in the introduction to his 2008. Matravers describes this 
kind of motivation as belonging to ‘an important Kantian tradition in liberalism, which focuses on autonomy and 
agency’, 2007, p.72. For further evidence of reliance on something like this motivation, consider the claim that 
luck egalitarianism forms a natural extension of Rawls, e.g. Kymlicka, 2002; Kaufman, 2004, p. 819. For a 
criticism of this view, see Scheffler 2003. 
25 E.g. Arneson, 2001, pp. 87-88; Cohen, 1989, p. 934; Matravers, 2007, p .79; Nagel, 1991, pp. 24-38. 
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